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REFLECTIONS ON BROWN
Paul D. Carrington*
We celebrate the anniversary of a great moment in our legal
history. Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court changed our law
bearing on race relations.' It did not, however, directly change
the society that had made that law, nor did it much alter the
behavior of those who were governed by it. It is important to
keep that distinction in mind.
Brown I marked only the beginning of the end of de jure
segregation, the despicable legal vestige of slavery. In
celebrating that moment, we need to remember that the primary
subject of the Court's decision, and the primary target of the
lawyers who brought the case, was dejure segregation. Equality
of educational opportunity, an objective we are still very far
from attaining, was a secondary and distant aim. Those who see
the subsequent history of public education as a defeat for the
Court2 were hoping for more than the Court supposed in 1954
that it could effect, and indeed more than it could effect then or
now.
Racial integration, even to the limited extent that we have
achieved it, has been perhaps America's greatest achievement as
a nation. You can talk about military victories or scientific
discoveries and inventions, and you may compare them
* Professor of Law, Duke University. This paper was written to be presented at Little
Rock, April 2, 2004. I thank Chris Machera, Duke Law 2005, for help on the history of the
Little Rock litigation and Kenny Ching, Duke Law 2006, for checking other sources.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. E.g. Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford U. Press 2004); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice
(2d ed., Vintage 2004); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? (U. Chi. Press 1991); see also e.g. Black, White andBrown: The Landmark
School Desegregation Case in Retrospect (Clare Cushman & Melvin I. Urofsky eds., CQ
Press 2004). Cass Sunstein imposes the same emphasis on the importance of de jure
segregation in his review of Klarman's From Jim Crow to Civil Rights. Cass R. Sunstein,
Did Brown Matter? 80 New Yorker 102 (May 3, 2004).
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favorably if you like to those of the Greeks or of the Romans or
other empires, or of other extraordinary cultures. But we ought
take greater pride in our recognition of the equal rights at law of
citizens without regard for color. It is a deplorably universal
human trait to subordinate and disdain others different from
ourselves. That trait has long blighted the human condition
around the world. Our laws no longer express, and even reject,
that destructive trait. Similar changes have since occurred
elsewhere, but to the extent that this is so, the American
example has provided a critical element-the belief that such a
deliberate change in a shared culture is possible.
The Court was in 1954 speaking for a cause already in
accelerating motion. As we salute its role we should surely give
credit to many others. We ought begin with a salute to Thomas
Jefferson and his colleagues who wrote the Declaration of
Independence. It has, I regret, become the fashion to condemn
Jefferson and others of his contemporaries for their failures to
emancipate their slaves and for the timidity of their opinions on
racial issues in the late stages of their lives. The politically
correct denunciation of these immortals reflects another widely
shared human failing that prevents us from seeing the world as
others at different times and places have seen it. My late friend
Leon Higginbotham, an African American, had it right in saying
that:
the unsophisticated might argue that the Declaration of
Independence had no ultimate impact of significance in
eradicating slavery or diminishing racial discrimination.
Yet in the corridors of history, there is a direct nexus
between the egalitarian words uttered, even if not yet
meant, and many of the changes that later took place.
The irony of the unfulfilled American dream of equality is
that of all those in the long line of dreamers who have
sought the ultimately just society, none had to seek out
3. Jefferson's teacher and mentor, George Wythe, and George Washington
emancipated their slaves pursuant to Virginia law enacted during the Revolution. That law
was repealed after the slave revolts of the early nineteenth century. Moreover, both
Jefferson and Madison were debtors whose creditors would have borne the cost of
emancipation. Still the most balanced account of Jefferson's timidity is David Brion Davis,
The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 164-184 (Cornell U. Press 1975).
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alien sources for moral authority. They had only to say to
the American people: fulfill the largest promise in your first
statement as a nation.
4
If Jefferson had personal failings, that is not a reason to
deny him his place in the "long line of dreamers." His words,
whatever his anxieties, were among those animating the lawyers
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People who sustained the legal pressure on the institutions of
Jim Crow.
We should also give credit to the early frontiersmen who
grew up in the early nineteenth century on the western slopes of
the Appalachians to become the first American nationalists and
the most ardent advocates of communitarian democracy. Equal
Rights was the name they gave to their demands. "Free labor,
free schools, free trade, and free speech" was their cry.5 They
opposed slavery and religious intolerance, and were the chief
source of the public school movement in most of the nation.
While the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause can
hardly be said to be an explicit expression of their politics, its
words resounded with their sentiments. Thomas Cooley, who
was born in frontier New York, grew up in the Equal Rights
tradition and became the most eminent American judge, legal
scholar, and law teacher of the last half of the nineteenth
century. As Chief Justice of Michigan in 1869, he led his court
to order the desegregation of the Detroit public schools. This
was one year after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and
seventy-five years before the Supreme Court addressed the
issue.6 Cooley's court was enforcing a Michigan statute
providing merely that public schools should be open to residents
of the district in which they were located. He noted, however,
that inasmuch as the statute controlled, it did "not become
important to consider what would otherwise have been the
law.",7 There is little question that Cooley and those who shared
his professional judgment would not have paused in enforcing
4. A. Leon Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal
Process: The Colonial Period 383-84 (Oxford U. Press 1978).
5. By their adversaries, members of the Equal Rights Party were designated
Barnburners. For a collection of Barnburner utterances, see A Collection of the Political
Writings of William Leggett (T. Sedgwick ed., Taylor & Dodd 1840).
6. People ex rel. Workman v. Bd. of Educ., 18 Mich. 400 (1869).
7. Id. at413.
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the Equal Protection Clause to assure the Equal Rights of the
children of the racial minority. Brown was an overdue triumph
for those of his persuasion. Public education was then
perpetuated and advanced in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century by the Progressives of that era, to whom we
are also in debt for Brown.
s
Give credit also to the many Southerners who survived the
Confederacy, the Reconstruction, and the era of Redemption by
the South's ruling class to continue to nurture humane and
egalitarian sentiments in the South. Brutal as were the laws of
the former Confederate states, and unspeakable as the lynchings
by the Ku Klux Klan were, there was always an undercurrent of
a more constructive and humane sentiment. 9 The Klan had, for
example, a ubiquitous adversary in the Association of Southern
Women Against Lynching led by Jessie Daniel Ames of
Georgetown, Texas.' 0 We might suitably in 2004 honor the
memory of Mrs. Ames and her colleagues.
She was not alone. Felix Frankfurter perceived that there
were many such Southerners who would welcome
desegregation. He had met them among his students at the
Harvard Law School. He exaggerated their influence, but he did
not mistake their presence or their feelings. Gunnar Myrdal
confirmed their presence in the 1930s in his majesterial study of
the institution of segregation." One did not have to be keenly
sensitive to react to the barbarism that was part of the culture I
knew as a child in Texas.
Let me give one example from my own experience.
Because so many men were in military service, the great
Barnum & Bailey circus was short-handed when it came to
Dallas in the fall of 1942. It advertised free admission for kids
who would come to the fair grounds to help unload its boxcars.
8. See Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in
American Education 1876-1957 (Vintage 1964).
9. This was perhaps most evident in the late nineteenth century when the biracial
Populists dominated the politics of North Carolina. See W.J. Cash, The Mind of the South
169-171 (Knopf 1941); John Hope Franklin & Alfred A. Moss, Jr, From Slavery to
Freedom: A History of Negro Americans 234 (6th ed., Knopf 1988).
10. See Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Revolt against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the
Women's Campaign against Lynching (Colum. U. Press 1979).
11. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern
Democracy (Harper & Rowe 1944).
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With a schoolmate, I rode my bike across the city in the wee
morning hours to get a job. We were assigned, with two other
eleven-year olds, to unload a boxcar of hay for the elephants.
We made a great mountain of hay bales outside the place where
the great circus tent was being pitched. Then for two hours, the
four of us played King-of-the-Mountain on the mountain we had
erected, throwing one another turn after turn down the haystack.
It was, as you can imagine, wonderful fun and we quickly
became fast friends. When it was time for the show, my
schoolmate and I were given tickets, but the other two
mountaineers were not. The circus attendant in charge
shamefacedly told them that they could not come in because
they were Negroes. I can still, over sixty-one years after the
event, see their faces.
My classmate and the ticket taker were as appalled as I
was. They, too, may well remember the event. And we were not
rare in our reaction to such experiences. I recall also that
Negroes were allowed to attend the State Fair of Texas on only
one of the fourteen days that the Fair was in session, and on that
day, my neighbors and I were not allowed to attend. Reacting to
such rules, I and many of my fellow undergraduates at the
University of Texas in the spring of 1949 petitioned the
governing Board of Regents to break the color line and admit
Heman Sweatt to our university's law school. I believe we
expressed a majority opinion among the University's students. It
is likely that the Regents were personally conflicted but in fear
of the reaction to such a decision.
Our sensitivities in 1949 were elevated, I have no doubt, by
the state of the world. Nazi Germany had taught us what lies at
the end of the racist road. And Communism was offering its
false promise to all those who felt aggrieved by the conflicts
between classes, including Americans of African ancestry.
Racial conflict risked enlarging the class war.12 The elimination
of that risk was a motive for desegregation. Perhaps therefore
we also in 2004 owe a salute to the victims of the Holocaust and
of Soviet imperialism. Many in Europe can be said to have died
for us.
12. See Mary Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61
(1988).
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We ought also to give credit to the military experience
shared by many Americans. There had been black military
heroes in every American war. It was the military who were the
first to desegregate, and they did so without a court order, on the
command of President Truman. As a draftee in 1955, I
experienced infantry training in a newly desegregated Sixth
Division. We were assigned bunks in alphabetical order, so that
I shared my life for eight weeks with James Brooks, who had
been shining shoes at the Corpus Christi railroad station, with
Forrest Brown, a warehouse guard from Oakland, and with
Manuel Cerda, a grocery clerk from San Antonio. Brooks and
Brown were African American, Cerda Hispanic. Like most
lawyers, I was a lousy infantryman, and survived the experience
of infantry training because those three buddies gave me
indispensable support. Few veterans who shared adventures of
that sort could tolerate the sight of separate drinking fountains.
Of course, the aspiration to break the color barrier was
more common outside the former states of the Confederacy. A
majority of Americans favored desegregation and their failure to
achieve it was in part due to flaws in our Constitution. A truly
representative national Congress would, long before 1954, have
taken steps in that direction pursuant to section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As Jack Balkin put it, Harry Truman
was willing in 1948 to bet his presidency on the issue of civil
rights. 13 But senators elected to represent Southern states, with
electorates from which African American voters were
effectively excluded, blocked the civil rights legislation
advanced by Truman.
This was merely further evidence that the federal
government is often not representative of the people it purports
to govern as, indeed, it was not intended to be by those who
wrote the Constitution of the United States. A century before the
failed Civil Rights Act of 1948, Frederick Grimk6 had observed
the structural inadequacy of our legislatures and the enlarged
political role of courts resulting from that inadequacy. 14 In the
three decades beginning in 1919, Charles Beard repeatedly
13. What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said 19 (Jack M. Balkin ed.,
N.Y.U. Press 2001).
14. Frederick Grimkd, The Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions (2d ed., H.W.
Derby & Co. 1856) (reprinted in 1968 by Harvard U. Press).
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called attention to the same deficiencies.' 5 Robert Dahl has
recently renewed the observation.' 6 Had Congress been a
democratic institution of the sort promised by the Declaration of
Independence, or even if the Fifteenth Amendment had been
enforced so that state governments in the South had represented
all their people, public institutions in America would have been
open to all their citizens no later than 1948. We should therefore
salute the memory of Harry Truman, and Hubert Humphrey, and
the other early champions of civil rights legislation.
Perhaps above all, we should give credit for our great
national achievement to Martin Luther King and his supporters
who put their lives at risk to call attention to the injustice of
segregation, thereby exciting the will to reform even among
many Southerners previously of the Confederate sort.' There
can be no need for me to elaborate on their role. We should
today be raising a toast to Rosa Parks. She was more important
and more admirable in what she did, than the nine old men who
decided Brown. And there were others, including many who,
long before King called upon us to do so, exposed themselves to
arrest or private violence, and even risked being lynched, for the
purpose of calling attention to the evil of Jim Crow laws. Even
before Brown, Harry Moore and his wife had been murdered for
their efforts to desegregate schools in Florida. 18 Such sacrifices
had made their cause ultimately irresistible in a nation of people
who had been schooled on the words of the Declaration.
And when one thinks of judges who should be honored, it
is not the Justices who should come first to mind. While some
previously segregated schools were quickly opened in
compliance with Brown, "all deliberate speed" was no speed at
all in some states and many school districts. Many members of
the federal judiciary were required to expose themselves to
personal risk as well as extreme hostility in their efforts to
enforce the Court's rhetoric in Brown. Let us not forget
15. E.g. Charles Austin Beard, American Government and Politics (Macmillan 1920).
16. E.g. Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic Is the American Constitution? (Yale U.
Press 2002).
17. The story is best told by David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr.
and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (HarperCollins 1986).
18. See Ben Green, Before His Time: The Untold Story of Harry T. Moore, America 's
First Civil Rights Martyr (Free Press 1999).
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Alabama's Judge Frank Johnson and others who withstood the
test posed for them by Brown. 19 No Justice did what they did.
We must also give credit to the Congress of the United
States that, however belatedly, enacted the Civil Rights Acts of
1964" and 1965. 2 True, those enactments did little more than
revive the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments that the courts
had been unable and perhaps even unwilling to enforce in the
seventy-five years preceding Brown.22 Those enactments were
what the draftsmen rather clearly had in mind when they added
the final section five to the Fourteenth Amendment, which
explicitly authorizes Congress to enact "appropriate legislation"
to secure enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. But until
Congress faced up to the issues, the federal courts were gasping
for breath if not wavering in the task that the Court had set for
them.
While we are saluting judicial heroes, a lesson to be learned
and not forgotten is that Brown failed to take hold in much of
the South until Congress sent the Department of Justice on the
mission of enforcement with popular moral support generated by
the movement led by King. Congress was prodded to take that
very important step by the Executive Branch in the person of
President Lyndon Johnson. 23 And in 1970, the administration of
President Richard Nixon initiated the final stages of
desegregation in the most intransigent states.24 They were
responding, the conservative Senator Everett Dirksen said, to
"an inexorable moral force." 25
The Court was to say the least diffident in its 1955 Brown
II decision 26 enforcing the change in our law that it had
19. See Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes: The Dramatic Story of the Southern Judges Who
Translated the Supreme Court's Brown Decision into a Revolution for Equality (Simon &
Schuster 1981).
20. 42 U.S.C. §1981 (2004) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2004) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
22. For an account of the failure with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, see Earl
M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Law of the Constitution (Carolina Academic
Press 2004).
23. For a brief account, see James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States
1945-1974 at 542-546 (Oxford U. Press 1996).
24. George P. Shultz, How a Republican Desegregated the South's Schools, 152 N.Y.
Times A23 (Jan. 8, 2003).
25. 110 Cong. Rec. 13320 (1964) (statement of Sen. Everett Dirksen).
26. Brown v. Bd of Educ., 349 U.S. 301 (1955).
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proclaimed the previous year. It was then and is to me a half
century later a sad fact that no remedy was provided to Linda
Brown, who could have been admitted to her school in Topeka
forthwith. The Court's failure to enforce her right seems to have
been the result of the Chief Justice's preoccupation with what he
perceived to be a need for unanimity. But the compromise
phrase, "with all deliberate speed," was taken by others, and not
unreasonably so, as an invitation to delay compliance forever.
We must, alas, therefore, in 2004 recall as well the
"massive resistance" to that moral force. It was first expressed in
the Southern Manifesto of 1956 denouncing Brown as contrary
to law, and a decision to be resisted by "all lawful means." 27 It
was almost invited by the Court's diffident expression of hope
for "deliberate speed" which brought a moment of prosperity to
a generation of Southern politicians who promised and
practiced, "massive resistance" to "racial mixing." Some of
them, I am ashamed to say, were lawyers. In its more
respectable form, their segregationist program was presented as
interposition, i.e., the legitimate rejection by a state of
interpretations of the federal Constitution deemed by it to be
unlawful usurpations of its sovereignty.
But as we recall that shame, we should recall those lawyers
who put themselves at risk for speaking out against the
Manifesto. Lewis F. Powell, then an eminent private lawyer in
Richmond, promptly proclaimed the doctrine to be "simply legal
nonsense."2  My late friend Robert Leflar, an eminent law
professor at the University of Arkansas, likewise declared that
there was "no legal basis whatever" for the doctrine of
interposition. 29 My friend William Murphy, a law professor at
the University of Mississippi, joined Powell and Leflar in their
rejection of the idea in a book review published in the
Mississippi Law Journal.30 This was more than the White
27. 102 Cong. Rec. 4459, 4460 (1956) (statement of Sen. Walter F. George). For a
recent reflection, see Robert J. Cottrol, Raymond T. Diamond, & Leland B. Ware, Brown
v. Board of Education: Caste, Culture and Constitution 187-189 (U. Press of Kan. 2003).
28. Mark Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme
Court 1936-1961 at 240 (Oxford U. Press 1994).
29. Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation 73
(Greenwood Press 1984).
30. William P. Murphy, Book Review, 29 Miss. L.J. 110 (1957) (reviewing James
Jackson Kilpatrick, The Sovereign States (Henry Regnery Co. 1957)).
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Citizens' Council could bear. Not only was Murphy fired at
Mississippi over the vehement protest of his dean and
colleagues, but the trustees at Vanderbilt University were
successfully pressured to withhold approval of an offer of a
visiting appointment that had been tendered by their law school.
Happily, Murphy landed an appointment at the University of
Missouri, and he is now my neighbor in North Carolina. But
repudiation by Powell, Leflar, Murphy, and many others of
repute did not prevent extensive efforts to perpetuate
interposition as segregationist doctrine, in Arkansas as
elsewhere in the South.
We all remember the vivid photograph of the 101st
Airborne Division leading the children up the steps into Little
Rock Central High School in 1958 to enforce the decision of the
Court in Cooper v. Aaron.31 They were commanded to do so by
President Dwight Eisenhower on the advice of his Attorney
General, Herbert Brownell. 32 From what we know, 3 3 it is at least
possible that the President had himself been tempted to echo the
utterance long attributed to President Andrew Jackson and say
that "Chief Justice Warren has issued his order, now let him
enforce it."' 34 If he was so tempted, we owe a salute to Herbert
Brownell for his intervention to save the day. But the use of
military force was not decisive. Even in Little Rock, the
presence of an airborne division did not lead to acceptance of a
mere court decision that purported to change the social order.
Indeed, Central High School was closed to all students in
1958-59. The School Board's new pupil assignment plan was
then held invalid in 1961 .35 Its "freedom of choice" lan passed
muster in 1966,36 but failed a challenge in 1970. Through
diverse travails involving efforts to consolidate school districts,
a settlement for Little Rock schools was reached in 1990 that
31. 358 U. S. 1 (1958).
32. Herbert Brownell & John Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Herbert Brownell
365-384 (U. Press of Kan. 1993).
33. Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower 409 (Simon & Schuster 1984); Emmet John
Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, 242-46 (Atheneum Books 1963).
34. On Jackson's alleged utterance, see Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall's
Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J. S. History 589 (1973).
35. Norwoodv. Tucker, 287 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961).
36. Clark v. Bd of Educ. of Little Rock Sch. Dist., 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966).
37. Clark v. Bd of Educ. ofLittle Rock Sch. Dist., 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970).
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"closely resembled consolidation.'"38 The matter of compliance
with the Court's order in Cooper v. Aaron remains today on the
docket of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas.
Memories of the resistance to Brown are important to
retain, and should be placed alongside knowledge of the
complexities confronted when comprehensive enforcement is
attempted. We should never suppose that law is an instrument
with which to effect quick and easy social change. Societies,
perhaps especially democratic societies, do not change on
command. They change in response to situations. Law can lend
support to reformist impulses independently motivated, but
people do not change their minds merely because judges tell
them to.
Moreover, there are inevitably secondary consequences of
those social changes in which law plays an instrumental role.
We know that action begets reaction in all human affairs. It is
often impossible to foresee the secondary and tertiary
consequences of what we do. It is especially unlikely that we
could in 1954 have predicted the remote consequences of a
change as complex as desegregation. We ought not celebrate a
great event of fifty years ago without at least trying to take
notice of its remote consequences not foreseeable by those
participating at the time.
I identify two for your reflection. First, consider what has
happened to public education in America in the last half century,
and wonder if Brown might have contributed to a general
decline in the effectiveness of many of our schools. The
NAACP lawyers rightly recognized that public education was
the most vulnerable point at which to attack Jim Crow.
Unfortunately, the same characteristics of schools making this
so also made the schools harder to change. There was some
resistance, to be sure, to the desegregation of public parks and
swimming pools, and to many other applications of the civil
rights laws. And the racist impulse abides in many personal
relationships among neighbors and co-workers. But schools
have been by far the hardest nut to crack for the reasons that
they engage intimate feelings of family identity and intersect
38. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Spec. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371 (8th
Cir. 1990), vacated, 949 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1991).
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with the ubiquitous ambitions of Americans to achieve social
and economic status. Because schools have been so hard to
change, it is possible to see some unintended harms to them
resulting from the demise of racial segregation.
Of course we are in no position to assess accurately
whether our schools are overall improving or deteriorating over
time. People who try to supply quantified answers to such a
question should not be taken too seriously.39 I am sure that our
schools have improved for African American children in the
Southern states.40 But I do not know about the rest.
41
Experienced schoolteachers in numerous communities across the
country have told me that parent-teacher meetings are not what
they used to be. If so, this may be a symptom of a larger
problem. The idea of the public school was that by sharing our
children as a democratic community, we extend the influence of
the parents most interested in the development of their children
to the children of other parents who for whatever reasons are
less able to guide their development.42 The public school was a
coming together of neighbors to pursue a communitarian
purpose served by the teacher as an assistant or surrogate to a
community of parents whose job was to socialize as well as
instruct children. If indeed many American parents are less
interested in their children's schools in 2004 than were their
forebears in 1954, it is possible that desegregation without social
integration has played an unfortunate role in that decline by
diminishing citizens' sense of community and elevating the risks
39. E.g. James S. Coleman et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity 21-22 (Off. of
Educ., U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. & Welfare 1966).
40. For a brief account of the education of Negro children in the South before
Reconstruction, see Henry J. Parkinson, The Imperfect Panacea: American Faith in
Education 1865-1965 (McGraw-Hill 1968).
41. E.g. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2004) (setting out the aims of the No Child Left Behind Act,
including improvements in assessment, accountability, teacher preparation, curricula and
curricular materials, standards, flexibility, enrichment, acceleration, school reform, and
parental involvement) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
42. For an account of the emergence of American public schools, see Michael B. Katz,
The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century
Massachusetts (Harvard U. Press 1968). Their continued development is reported by
Marvin Lazerson, Origins of the Urban School: Public Education in Massachusetts, 1870-
1915 (Harvard U. Press 1971), and David B. Tyack, The One Best System: A History of
Urban Education (Harvard U. Press 1974).
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of alienation, thereby weakening the moral infrastructure of
parental support for our schools.
Surely there are many other possible causes if our schools
are less effective than once they were; these include television
entertainment, computer games, the reduction in family size,
single parents, the advent of the two-career family with more
money and less time to spend on their children, technological
change, suburbanization and the advent not merely of suburbs
but of communities walled in and gated to keep out alien
influences. As we have "mainstreamed" children with various
learning disabilities and assigned to our public schools
responsibility for such sensitive matters as sex education, some
schools may have been overloaded with difficult or disputed
aims for which they may be less suited. We have witnessed not
only white flight, but black flight as well when the situations
permitted it. Because the minorities are disproportionately
impecunious, their children are over-represented in the schools
facing the most challenging educational missions, and under-
represented in the schools serving the most stable and supportive
communities. For these or perhaps other reasons, private day
schools flourish in many cities, and perhaps as many as a million
children are home-schooled. The children who are ill-served are
most often the children of the poor, and the race of their parents
is generally only incidental. There are, of course, many other
causes for the plights of our public schools and of the children of
the poor. I do not suggest that desegregation is a major source of
those problems. I mean only to present that possibility as an
example of a secondary and unfortunate consequence that was
not foreseen as a possible effect of Brown by many of us who
cheered the decision.
Derrick Bell was among the first to call attention to the risk
of loss of community support for schools, but not until 1976,
when he observed that not all black parents wanted to surrender
the control of their children to predominantly white
institutions. 43 As a staunch advocate of metropolitan bussing in
northern cities in the 1970s, it was not a concern of mine even
though I was at the time very much involved in public education
as a member of a local school board and fully aware of the needs
43. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976).
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of schools for community support. 44 I recall as a measure of my
own blindness, my astonishment at the negative reaction of the
Inkster, Michigan, school board when in 1973 I offered to
represent them in a suit to merge their underfinanced district
with that of neighboring Dearborn, then the "richest district" in
the state in terms of local tax revenues. The predominantly black
population of Inkster had no interest whatever in sending their
children to Dearborn schools, where, it was presumed, they and
their parents would inevitably be regarded as aliens to be
subordinated, even if the amount of money being spent on their
education would be increased four-fold.
A second, more direct, secondary effect of Brown has been
an inflation of the Supreme Court's sense of itself. The opinion
of the Court in Brown I was not especially convincing as a legal
argument. The weakness of the opinion not only made it
vulnerable to the Southern Manifesto's protest that the decision
was a lawless act, but exposed it to thoughtful criticism in two
Holmes Lectures presented at the Harvard Law School by two of
the wisest American lawyers of the age, Learned Hand45 and
Herbert Wechsler.46  Each found the opinion lacking
persuasiveness despite his deep sympathy with the Court's
political objective. In the vast literature on Brown I, there has
been very little said in defense of the Court's opinion. It was
accepted by most of the legal profession as an invocation of
natural law: not an application of a pre-existing legal text or
tradition, but a proclamation of a universal principle applicable
to all men and women at all times and perhaps of divine origin.
This seemed most evident when the Court extended its holding
to the District of Columbia, to which the Equal Protection
Clause was not explicitly applicable.4 7
The idea of natural law was implicit in the text of the
Declaration of Independence when it spoke of "unalienable
44. I was mindful of the need for community involvement in expressing my views on
the movement rising in the 1960s to equalize school funding. On Egalitarian Overzeal: A
Polemic against the Local School Property Tax Cases, 1972 U. Ill. L. Forum 232 (1972);
Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1227
(1973).
45. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 54-55 (Harvard U. Press 1958).
46. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1959).
47. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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rights." It is also celebrated in traditional Catholic doctrine, and
was enthusiastically advocated in the 1940s by8 Clarence
Manion, the eminent law dean at Notre Dame. 8 But our
Constitution is a written text and does not commission the Court
to enforce any right that the Justices in their superior wisdom
might deem to be unalienable.
This was not, I think, an oversight by James Madison and
his colleagues. There is a problem with natural law. It requires
very special qualifications for those who presume to discern and
enforce it. Because it is immune to competitive politics, it is thus
a repudiation of the right to self-government, at least when those
who discern and enforce it are in no way accountable to the
people for their interpretations. Which the Supreme Court of the
United States assuredly is not. Its members when invoking
natural law proclaim themselves to be an American College of
Cardinals who presume to tell us how to live and what to think.
The claim of the Court to the high status of interpreter of
natural law was articulated in its decision regarding the
desegregation of Little Rock Central High School. In Cooper v.
Aaron, the Court for the first time expressed the view that it
alone was empowered to interpret the Constitution and that
anyone taking an oath to uphold that document was bound by its
interpretation and could recognize no other.49 With those words,
it not only scorned the Southern Manifesto, but rose above its
own past. It had forgotten numerous moments of defiance or
noncompliance by the other branches of the federal government
such as that of Presidents Jackson and Lincoln, and by state
officials who had adhered to their own interpretations of
constitutional texts. The Court had theretofore, with rare
exception, performed its work with a measure of diffidence born
partly from its awareness that it was but one mortal element in a
complex constitutional order owing respect to the prerogatives
and responsibilities of others whose support it very much
needed.
The Court should have learned from its experience with
desegregation in the decade following Brown that people seldom
48. E.g. Clarence Manion, Lessons in Liberty: A Study of God in Government (U. Notre
Dame Press 1939).
49. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18-19.
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change their opinions to conform to its opinions.50 That it
learned the opposite lesson was made clear in the imbroglio
following its much-celebrated and much-maligned decision in
Roe v. Wade.51 Like the decision in Brown, the opinion of the
Court in that case was strikingly unconvincing even to many
lawyers and citizens who favor a woman's right to choose, and
who were in the process of changing the laws of most states to
affirm that right. Whereas the decision in Brown was rooted in
the text of the Equal Protection Clause, and perhaps plausibly in
the text of the Due Process Clause, there was no constitutional
text on which Roe could be based. But having desegregated our
schools, the Court was confident that it could supply American
women with the right to choose without need of authorization
from a legislative body commissioned to represent the people.
The advent of the Right to Life Movement 52 was a direct
reaction to the Court's false estimation of its own power and
influence. The result was less than free choice for women,
because those in deep disagreement with the Court, having no
forum for direct political response, were moved to the practice
of civil disobedience and even terrorism. 53 And the issue of Life
or Choice quickly came to dominate the politics of federal
judicial appointment, and even to play an important role in
presidential elections. How to reverse the decision has been in
many minds a central issue for every presidential election since
1980. It is indeed possible that President Reagan and both
Presidents Bush owe their elections to Roe v. Wade.
Nevertheless, when the Rehnquist Court confronted the
possibility of overruling Roe, it did not merely reaffirm its
former decision. It went on to explain that a decision to overrule
such an important decision would call its own legitimacy into
question and invite continued protest. It called upon the people
of the United States, as "people who aspire to live according to
the Rule of Law," to understand that this ideal required them to
understand that only the Court is "invested with the authority to
50. For further development of this point, see Rosenberg, supra n. 2.
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. Tipping the Scales: The Christian Right's Legal Crusade against Choice (Ctr. for
Reproductive L. & Policy 1998).
53. Patricia Baird-Windle & Eleanor J. Bader, Targets of Hatred: Anti-abortion
Terrorism (Palgrave 2001).
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decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for
their constitutional ideals."54 In other words, you don't even
have to be an officer sworn to uphold the Constitution to be
bound to accept the Court's views. All of us who respect the
idea of law are somehow bound to accept the Court's wisdom
about the natural law in which our "unalienable rights" are
embedded. I share Scot Powe's assessment that "[s]earching for
worse modern constitutional doctrine than this would be
fruitless. 55 It might be equally fruitless to search for a more
self-aggrandizing statement than this. I do not myself regard a
fetus as a human life, but I respect the right of my fellow
citizens passionately to disagree with me and the Court on the
point. No American, even one sworn to uphold the Constitution,
is obliged to respect the utterances of nine elders even when
they, as they must, risk consequences when their behavior is
defiant of those utterances. That, after all, was what Martin
Luther King was explicitly teaching us, that bad law ought be
respectfully disobeyed no matter who made it. There is thus a
resemblance between those who bore the cross with King and
some of those who bear it for unborn fetuses, at least those who
have not practiced or supported terrorism. Those of us who
respected and followed King owe the Right to Lifers a measure
of respect even if we are in profound disagreement with them on
the scientific and religious issues the Court commissioned itself
to decide.
In its consideration of other matters bearing on sexuality,
the Court has again demonstrated its inclination to make natural
law in disregard of the text of the Constitution. One need not
favor the criminal punishment of homosexuality to regard
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas5 6 as an
offensive arrogation. Robert Post assures us that the opinion is
"the opening bid in a conversation that the Court expects to hold
with the American public."57 Perhaps so, but there is little in our
54. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992).
55. L.A. Powe, Jr., Book Review: The Not So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117
Harv. L. Rev. 669 (2003) (reviewing Mark V. Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order
(Princeton U. Press 2003)).
56. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 104 (2003).
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experience to confirm that such a conversation is possible. To
whom might the Court listen? Is there any way to communicate
with it other than by taking to the streets as the Right to Lifers
did? As was the case in Roe, there was already in place a trend
decriminalizing homosexuality, with scant resistance in most
communities. Whether the Court's action will improve the social
acceptability of homosexuality, in the way that legislation
enacted by representatives of the people can, or will have the
58
reverse effect remains to be seen.
Then there is Bush v. Gore.59 The text of the Constitution is
as clear as sunlight as to how a contest over a presidential
election is to be resolved. In important respects, the
constitutional process set forth in Article Two is clumsy and
anti-democratic. There is only one feature of it that made good
sense in 1789 and that makes good sense today. And that is that
the Supreme Court of the United States should have nothing to
do with the selection of the President of the United States who
selected its members. Of the thirteen persons in the nation
having the greatest personal stake in the outcome of an election,
nine sit on the Court. The identity of the President controls
whether a Justice is to sit in the majority and exercise for years
the gratifying power of proclaiming law with which all citizens
are expected and required to agree, or is left merely to fulminate
in a minority. For that reason, all nine Justices should have
recused themselves from deciding the most purely political
question ever presented to the Court. There was no serious
pretext that the decision of the Court in Bush v. Gore was an
application of law faithful to the controlling text. It must be
viewed as an expression of a personal preference by five Justices
who think that the rest of us should accept what they tell us even
when the subject is one they are forbidden by law to address.
We are thus indeed now living in a nation subordinated to
judicial supremacy. One result is that the selection of life-
tenured federal judges has been placed on the central stage of
58. On prior experience with the Court as an agent of social change, see Lee Epstein &
Joseph E. Kobylka, The Supreme Court and Legal Change: Abortion and the Death
Penalty (U.N.C. Press 1992); Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Power and American Character:
Censoring Ourselves in an Anxious Age (Oxford U. Press 1994); and Rosenberg, supra n.
2.
59. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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American politics. A secondary result of this development is that
those who are selected and confirmed as Justices must be
persons deemed suited to the task of discerning and enforcing
natural law. It is to me troubling that persons selected for that
role in recent decades lack substantial political experience, or
even much professional experience as lawyers engaged in the
resolution of disputes. Whereas the Warren Court was staffed
with Justices of vast experience in public affairs, the present
Court is sadly lacking in that qualification. This lack reinforces
the Court's apparently growing inability to regard with proper
respect the decisions either of other branches of government or
of state and local governments. One may continue to scorn, as I
do, the arguments we heard fifty years ago in favor of States'
Rights as reasons to permit continued de jure segregation, and
yet now regret that the Court has loosened the restraints on itself
as a second-guesser of all manner of political decisions made at
all levels of government.
This transformation of our government to place a life-
tenured elite at its center, like the aforementioned transformation
of public education, can hardly be said to be solely the result of
Brown. Jeffersonians complained almost two centuries ago of
the tendency of the Marshall Court to engage in freewheeling
interpretation of constitutional texts.6 ° It seems likely that the
architecture of the Supreme Court's building erected under the
leadership of Chief Justice Taft contributes to the Justices'
inflated sense of themselves. As did the 1925 legislation
conferring on the Court the power to control its own docket.6'
Still, it seems likely that the event we celebrate today, and
especially its enforcement in Little Rock by the 101st Airborne
Division, was an important step down this road.
Many and perhaps most lawyers exult in this enhancement
of the role of the Court.6 2 As lawyers, we tend to share its
glories and bask in them, for it is a part of our profession. If the
Court makes natural law, then we share in its semi-divine role.
60. E.g. John Taylor, Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated (Shepard &
Pollard 1820) (reprinted in 1970 by DaCapo Press).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982).
62. E.g. Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme
Court (Harvard U. Press 1999); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order
(Princeton U. Press 2003).
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Similar trends toward the self-empowerment of the judiciary by
judges liberating themselves from the duty to heed pre-existin
texts can be seen in many other nations: Canada,63 Australia,
and India 65 are examples.
In support of this trend, Christopher Eisgruber assures us
that life-tenured Justices have the capacity and the will to make
moral judgments comporting with the will of the people.66 There
is no reason to doubt that Justices honestly strive to do that. I
have worked with many judges over many years and will vouch
for the integrity of every one of them that I have known. I will,
however, not go so far as Chief Justice Taft, who affirmed that
our judges "typify on earth what we shall meet hereafter in
heaven under a just God., 67 While they are admirable mortals, I
doubt that they have the extraordinary wisdom to know our
collective minds on deeply divisive issues.
And even if the Court is indeed Solomon, there is the
consequence of the disempowerment of citizens. At the end of
the road the Court has taken, it risks finding that the citizens'
sense of shared responsibility has been seriously reduced by its
self-aggrandizement. That was a concern and a forecast
expressed in 1848 by Frederick Grimk6, an eminent judge of
that time, and in 1893 expressed again in different form by
James Bradley Thayer. 68 It was their belief, as it is mine, that the
sense of shared responsibility is a critical source of the mutual
trust that is indispensable to a stable democratic society. A
people who look to nine elders to tell them what to think cannot
be expected to maintain the interest in government required to
assure its acceptance and stability over time.
63. F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party
(Broadview Press 2000).
64. Haig Patapan, Judging Democracy: The New Politics of the High Court of
Australia (Cambridge U. Press 2000). For a general account of the political role of
Australian courts, see Enid Campbell & H.P. Lee, The Australian Judiciary (Cambridge U.
Press 2002).
65. S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism in India (Oxford U. Press 2002); U.C. Jain & Jeevan
Nair, Judiciary in India (Pointer Publishers 2000).
66. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Harvard U. Press 2001).
67. Judith Icke Anderson, William Howard Taft: An Intimate History 259 (W.W.
Norton& Co. 1981).
68. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
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For myself, I would be more comfortable about the future
of American law if the Court were less arrogant. I would this
year, fifty years after Brown, wish that the Justices might
remember the defiant words attributed to President Jackson, and
recall the days of Court-packing. Beneath the odious Southern
Manifesto of 1956 was a lesson about the role and power of
judges that the Court seems to have forgotten, of which it needs
somehow to be reminded.
It bears notice on occasions such as this that hundreds of
constitutions have been written for states and nations around the
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world, many of them since 1954, and not one has created a
high court responsible for its enforcement whose members are
assigned their powers for life. This is striking given that many
nations face problems resembling the one addressed in America
in 1954. The idea of constitutional law enforced by professional
judges is widely admired, but not the idea of natural law
enforced by elders situated in a Grecian temple and accountable
only to Zeus.
I thus return to the main point I wish to make. For the end
of segregation by law, it is the American people who should be
saluted above all others. Humanity is more humane because of
what we Americans have done. And it is this shared
achievement, not the mere utterance of our elders, that we
should celebrate today.
69. A recent compilation is Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Albert P.
Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flantz eds., Oceana Publications 1990). Western Samoan judges
serve for life, but their constitution is not difficult to amend.

